Miranda, et al. vs. Tuliao

Miranda, et al. vs. Tuliao

   October 23, 2017       FJ

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JOSE MIRANDA, et al. vs. VIRGILIO TULIAO

G.R. NO. 158763 MARCH 31, 2006

486 SCRA 377

PLEASE NOTE THAT YOU ARE PRESUMED THAT YOU HAVE READ THE ORIGINAL TEXT OF THE CASE. THIS IS FOR THE PURPOSE OF REVIEW. *Read at your own risk* :)

(Criminal Procedure)

FACTS:

·         March 8, 1996 – burnt dead bodies of  Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao were found in Ramon, Isabela.

·         Two  informations for muder were filed against, SPO1 Leaño, SPO1 Marzan, SPO1 Agustin, SPO2 Micu, SPO2 Maderal, and SPO4 Ramirez in the RTC Santiago City

·         The venue was later transferred in Manila

·         April 22, 1999 – RTC Manila ➜  All = CONVICTED EXCEPT SPO2 Madera while has yet to be arraigned.

·         Sept. 1999 - Maderal was arrested

·         April 27, 2001 – Maderal ➜  Sworn confession and identified Miranda, PO3 Ocon, SPO3 Dalmacio, Boyet dela Cruz and Amado Doe – responsible for the death of the victims

·         Tuliao ---- filed a complaint for murder

·         June 29 - Miranda➜  Urgent motion to complete PI, to reinvestigate, and to recall and/or quash the woa.

·         July 6 – In the hearing of the urgent motion, Judge Tumaliuan noted the absence of the petitioners ➜ Joint Order – DENIED because the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons

·         Miranda ➜  appealed the reso of the State Prosec to the DOJ.

·         August 17 – PJ Anghad took over ➜  Joint Order – reversing the JO of the former Judge and ordered the cancellation of the WOA ➜  also applied to Ocon and Dalmacio.

·         Tulia and SP ➜ MR and prayed inhibition of PJ Anghad ➜ DENIED

·         Case against the first set of accused who were convicted = APPEALED➜ SC ➜  Oct. 9, 2001 – ACQUITTED

·         Oct. 25, 2001 – Tuliao➜  Cert. Prohib. Mandam. With TRO➜  SC

·         Nov. 12, 2001 – SC➜ Reso – GRANT the Petition

·         Nov. 14, 2001 – PJ Anghad➜  DISMISSED the two informations

·         Nov. 15, 2001 - SC ➜ TRO while referring the petition to CA

·         Dec. 18, 2002 - CA ➜ GRANTED and ORDER the reinstatement of the crim cases in the RTC Santiago and issuance of woa

·         Miranda ➜ MR ➜  DENIED

HELD: in favor Tuliao

·         The case is reinstated and transferred to the RTC Manila

·         PJ Anghad exercised grave abuse of discretion

·         CUSTODY OF LAW v. JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON

(YES) there can be COL = no JOP
(YES) there can be JOP = not in COL

(In Pico Case) 
 GR: One who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court.

ETR: SPECIAL APPEARANCES

In the case of pleadings whose prayer is precisely for the avoidance of the jurisdiction of the court. These pleadings are:

1. CIVIL CASES	MT Dismiss – LOJ over the person of the defendant (whether or not other grounds for dismissal are included)	Consequences of the fact that FAILURE to file = WAIVER of the defense “Lack of Jurisdiction Over the Person”
2. CRIMINAL CASES	MT Quash a complaint – LOJ over the person of the accused
3.	MT Quash a WOA	That it is the very legality of the court process forcing the submission of the person of the accused that is the very issue in a MTQ of the woa

(In Santiago Case)
Seeking affirmative relief whether civil or criminal = voluntary appearance

CUSTODY OF LAW	JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON
Required for the application for bail	NOT
NOT required for the adjudication of other relief sought.	Mere application = waiver of the defense lack of JOP
Accomplished by ARREST or VOLUNTARY SURRENDER	Acquired upon ARREST or VOLUNTARY APPEARANCE
Literally custody over the body of the accused

OTHER NOTES:

Criminal Procedure; Warrants of Arrest; Even if the petition for review of the resolution of the assistant prosecutor was filed with the Secretary of Justice before the issuance of the warrants of arrest, the fact remains that the pendency of a petition for the review of the prosecutor's resolution is not a ground to quash the warrants of arrest.

After Judge Tumaliuan issued warrants for the arrest of petitioners, petitioner Miranda appealed the assistant prosecutor's resolution before the Secretary of Justice. Judge Anghad, shortly after assuming office, quashed the warrant of arrest on the basis of said appeal. According to Judge Anghad, "x x x prudence dictates (that) and because of comity, a deferment of the proceedings is but proper."

Quashal on this basis is grave abuse of discretion. It is inconceivable to charge Judge Tumaliuan as lacking in prudence and oblivious to comity when he issued the warrants of arrest against petitioners just because the petitioners might, in the future, appeal the assistant prosecutor's resolution to the Secretary of Justice. But even if the petition for review was filed before the issuance of the warrants of arrest, the fact remains that the pendency of a petition for the review of the prosecutor's resolution is not a ground to quash the warrants of arrest.

Criminal Procedure; Probable Cause; Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt.

It is important to note that an exhaustive debate on the credibility of a witness is not within the province of the determination of probable cause. As we held in Webb:

A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. As well put in Brinegar v. United States, while probable cause demands more than "bare suspicion," it requires "less than evidence which would justify x x x conviction." A finding of probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. It is not a pronouncement of guilt.

x x x Probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and should be determined in a summary manner. Preliminary investigation is not a part of trial x x x.

Criminal Procedure; Judgments; A decision acquitting the accused of a crime cannot be the basis of the dismissal of criminal case against different accused for the same crime.

A decision, even of this Court, acquitting the accused therein of a crime cannot be the basis of the dismissal of criminal case against different accused for the same crime.  The blunder of Judge Anghad is even more pronounced by the fact that our decision in Leaño was based on reasonable doubt.  We never ruled in Leaño that the crime did not happen; we just found that there was reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused therein, since the prosecution in that case relied on circumstantial evidence, which interestingly is not even the situation in the criminal cases of the petitioners in the case at bar as there is here an eyewitness: Rodel Maderal.  The accused in Leaño furthermore had no motive to kill respondent Tuliao's son, whereas petitioners herein had been implicated in the testimony of respondent Tuliao before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee.

Criminal Procedure; The declaration of nullity of proceedings should be deemed to carry with it the reinstatement of the orders set aside by the nullified proceedings.

Whether the Court of Appeals ordered the issuance of new warrants of arrest or merely ordered the reinstatement of the warrants of arrest issued by Judge Tumaliuan is merely a matter of scrupulous semantics, the slight inaccuracy whereof should not be allowed to affect the dispositions on the merits, especially in this case where the other dispositions of the Court of Appeals point to the other direction.  Firstly, the Court of Appeals had reinstated the 25 June 2001 Order of Judge Tumaliuan, which issued the warrants of arrest.  Secondly, the Court of Appeals likewise declared the proceedings conducted by Judge Anghad void.  Certainly, the declaration of nullity of proceedings should be deemed to carry with it the reinstatement of the orders set aside by the nullified proceedings. Judge Anghad's order quashing the warrants of arrest had been nullified; therefore those warrants of arrest are henceforth deemed unquashed.

Criminal Procedure; Constitutional Law; Double Jeopardy cannot be invoked where the accused has not been arraigned and it was upon his express motion that the case was dismissed.

The reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed before arraignment does not constitute double jeopardy.  Double jeopardy cannot be invoked where the accused has not been arraigned and it was upon his express motion that the case was dismissed. 

Criminal Law; Bails; Custody of the law is required before the court can act upon the application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other reliefs sought by the defendant where the mere application therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused.

Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction between custody of the law and jurisdiction over the person. Custody of the law is required before the court can act upon the application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other reliefs sought by the defendant where the mere application therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused. Custody of the law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary surrender, while jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance. One can be under the custody of the law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, such as when a person arrested by virtue of a warrant files a motion before arraignment to quash the warrant. On the other hand, one can be subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet not be in the custody of the law, such as when an accused escapes custody after his trial has commenced. Being in the custody of the law signifies restraint on the person, who is thereby deprived of his own will and liberty, binding him to become obedient to the will of the law. Custody of the law is literally custody over the body of the accused. It includes, but is not limited to, detention.

Criminal Law; A person applying for admission to bail must be in the custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty. A person who has not submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court has no right to invoke the processes of that court.

The statement in Pico v. Judge Combong, Jr., cited by the Court of Appeals should not have been separated from the issue in that case, which is the application for admission to bail of someone not yet in the custody of the law.  The entire paragraph of our pronouncement in Pico reads: 

A person applying for admission to bail must be in the custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty.  A person who has not submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court has no right to invoke the processes of that court.  Respondent Judge should have diligently ascertained the whereabouts of the applicant and that he indeed had jurisdiction over the body of the accused before considering the application for bail.

While we stand by our above pronouncement in Pico insofar as it concerns bail, we clarify that, as a general rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. As we held in the aforecited case of Santiago, seeking an affirmative relief in court, whether in civil or criminal proceedings, constitutes voluntary appearance.

Criminal Law; Courts; Jurisdictions; Filing of pleadings seeking affirmative relief constitutes voluntary appearance and consequent submission of one's person to the jurisdiction of the court, Exceptions.

There is, however, an exception to the rule that filing pleadings seeking affirmative relief constitutes voluntary appearance, and the consequent submission of one's person to the jurisdiction of the court. This is in the case of pleadings whose prayer is precisely for the avoidance of the jurisdiction of the court, which only leads to a special appearance. 

These pleadings are:

(1) in civil cases, motions to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, whether or not other grounds for dismissal are included;

(2) in criminal cases, motions to quash a complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused; and

(3) motions to quash a warrant of arrest. The first two are consequences of the fact that failure to file them would constitute a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person. The third is a consequence of the fact that it is the very legality of the court process forcing the submission of the person of the accused that is the very issue in a motion to quash a warrant of arrest.

Judicial Ethics; Judges; Abuse of Discretion; Records and supporting evidence show that Judge Anghad gravely abused his discretion. 

After a careful scrutiny of the records of the case, including the supporting evidence to the resolution of the prosecutor in his determination of probable cause, we find that Judge Anghad gravely abused his discretion.