THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF BAGUIO CITY, et al. vs. ATTY. BRAIN MASWENG, et al.

THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF BAGUIO CITY, et al. vs. ATTY. BRAIN MASWENG, et al.

   November 17, 2017       FJ

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THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF BAGUIO CITY, et al. vs. ATTY. BRAIN MASWENG, et al.

G.R. NO. 180206

FEBRUARY 4, 2009

PONENTE: TINGA, J.

FACTS:

City Mayor of Baguio City, Braulio D. Yaranon, ordering the demolition of the illegal structures constructed by Lazaro Bawas, Alexander Ampaguey, Sr. and a certain Mr. Basatan on a portion of the Busol Watershed Reservation located at Aurora Hill, Baguio City, without the required building permits and in violation of Sec 69 of PD No. 705, as amended, PD No. 1096 and RA No. 7279.

Private respondents basically claimed that the lands where their residential houses stand are their ancestral lands which they have been occupying and possessing openly and continuously since time immemorial; that their ownership thereof have been expressly recognized in Proclamation No. 15 dated April 27, 1922 and recommended by the DENR for exclusion from the coverage of the Busol Forest Reserve. They, thus, contended that the demolition of their residential houses is a violation of their right of possession and ownership of ancestral lands accorded by the Constitution and the law, perforce, must be restrained.

The corresponding demolition advices dated September 19, 2006 were issued informing the occupants thereon of the intended demolition of the erected structures on October 17 to 20, 2006. Consequently, private respondents filed a petition for injunction with prayer for the issuance of a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction against the Office of the City Mayor of Baguio City before the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples, Cordillera Administrative Region (NCIP-CAR). The NCIP-CAR, on October 16 and 19, 3006, issued 2 TROs and issued Demolition Orders. The petitioners appealed before the CA, and the latter upheld the NCIP and affirmed the TROs

The government claims that Busol Forest Reservation is exempt from ancestral claims as it is needed for public welfare. It is allegedly one of the few remaining forests in Baguio City and is the city's main watershed. Further, they also claim that the NCIP has no jurisdiction to hear and decide main actions for injunction.

Further, the IPRA provides that Baguio City shall be governed by its Charter. Thus, private respondents cannot claim their alleged ancestral lands under the provisions of the IPRA.

As a defense, the private respondents contend that jurisdiction of the NCIP to take cognizance of and decide main actions for injunction arguing that the IPRA does not state that the NCIP may only issue such writs of injunction as auxiliary remedies, and that the IPRA does not exempt Baguio City from its coverage nor does it state that there are no ancestral lands in Baguio City.

ISSUE:

         Whether the Busol Forest Reservation is exempted under the IPRA law.

HELD:

No, the provision indeed states that Baguio City is governed by its own charter. Its exemption from the IPRA, however, cannot ipso facto be deduced because the law concedes the validity of prior land rights recognized or acquired through any process before its effectivity. The IPRA demands that the city's charter respect the validity of these recognized land rights and titles.

The Proclamation No. 15, however, does not appear to be a definitive recognition of private respondents' ancestral land claim. The proclamation merely identifies the Molintas and Gumangan families, the predecessors-in-interest of private respondents, as claimants of a portion of the Busol Forest Reservation but does not acknowledge vested rights over the same.

Hence, the Busol Forest Reservation remains inalienable as decided in the case of Heirs of Gumangan v. Court of Appeals.

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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EAST SILVERLANE REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EAST SILVERLANE REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

   November 17, 2017       FJ

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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EAST SILVERLANE REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

G.R. NO. 186961

FEBRUARY 20, 2012

PONENTE: REYES, J.

FACTS:

            The East Silverlan Realty Development Corporation filed with the RTC an application for and registration, covering a parcel of land in Cagayan Cadastre, El Salvador, Misamis Oriental. The corporation purchased the portion of the subject property (Area A) from Francisca Oco pursuant to a Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 27, 1990 and the remaining portion (Area B) from Rosario U. Tan Lim, Nemesia Tan and Mariano U. Tan pursuant to a Deed of Partial Partition with Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 11, 1991. It was claimed that the respondent’s predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, continuous and exclusive possession of the subject property since June 12, 1945.

On August 27, 2004, the RTC granted the registration of the land. On appeal, the CA affirmed the lower court’s decision and held that the corporation has met all the requirement of the application for land registration, herein:

(1) the land is alienable public land;

(2) the applicant’s open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation thereof must be since June 12, 1945, or earlier; and

(3) it is a bona fide claim of ownership

However, the RP assails that the corporation failed to prove that its predecessors-in-interest possessed the subject property in the manner and for the length of time required under Sec 48 (b) of CA No. 141 and Sec 14 of P.D. No. 1529. Further, it did not present a credible and competent witness to testify on the specific acts of ownership performed by its predecessors-in-interest on the subject property.

ISSUE:

Whether the East Silverlane has proven itself entitled to the benefits of the Public Land Act and P.D. No. 1529 on confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles?

HELD:

No. It was revealed that the evidence submitted by the East Silverlane fell short of proving that it has acquired an imperfect title over the subject property under Sec 48 (b) of the PLA. The corporation cannot register the subject property in its name on the basis of either Sec 14 (1) or (2) of P.D. No. 1529. It was not established by the required quantum of evidence that the East Silverlan and its predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject property for the prescribed statutory period.

            The PLA governs the classification and disposition of lands of the public domain. Under Sec 11 thereof, one of the modes of disposing public lands suitable for agricultural purposes is by "confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles".  On the other hand, Sec 48 provides the grant to the qualified possessor of an alienable and disposable public land.

P.D. No. 1529, which was enacted on June 11, 1978, codified all the laws relative to the registration of property.

Sec 14 (1) and (2) are clearly different. Former section covers "alienable and disposable land" while Sec 14 (2) covers "private property". As this Court categorically stated in jurisprudence, the distinction between the two provisions lies with the inapplicability of prescription to alienable and disposable lands. Specifically:

At the same time, 14(2) puts into operation the entire regime of prescription under the Civil Code, a fact which does not hold true with respect to 14(1).

On this basis, respondent would have been eligible for application for registration because his claim of ownership and possession over the subject property even exceeds thirty (30) years.

However, it is jurisprudentially clear that the thirty (30)-year period of prescription for purposes of acquiring ownership and registration of public land under Sec 14 (2) of P.D. No. 1529 only begins from the moment the State expressly declares that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial.

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PO SUN TUN vs. W.S. PRICE and PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF LEYTE

PO SUN TUN vs. W.S. PRICE and PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF LEYTE

   November 17, 2017       FJ

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PO SUN TUN vs. W.S. PRICE and PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF LEYTE

G.R. NO. 31346

DECEMBER 28, 1929

PONENTE: MALCOLM, J.

FACTS:

            On November 29, 1921, Gabino Po Ejap was the owner of a certain parcel of land situated in the Tacloban, Leyte. On the same date, he sold the land to Po Tecsi for the sum of P8,000 and the latter gave general power of attorney to the former including the right to sell. Gabino and Po Tecsi are brothers, while Gabino and Po Sun Tun are father and son.

On June 21, 1923, Po mortgaged the land to W. S. Price in the amount of P17,000. The mortgage was duly noted in the office of the RD on August 18th of the same year.

Acting under this power, Gabino sold the land on November 22, 1923, for P8,000 to Jose H. Katigbak. On this document there appears on the upper right-hand margin the following: "Register of Deeds, Received, Dec. 15, 1923, Province of Leyte."

On December 17, 1924, Po executed a deed of sale of the land to Price in consideration of P17,000. This sale was recorded with the RD on January 22, 1925.

On February 16, 1927, Price with the consent of his wife, sold the land to the Province of Leyte for P20,570. On March 17, 1927, the OCT was issued in the name of the spouses Price. Later, the proper transfer certificate of title was provided for the Province of Leyte. On October 12, 1927, Katigbak transferred the property to Po Sun Tun for P8,000.

Presently, the possession of the property has been under the control of Price and the Provincial Government and has not been under the material control of Po Sun Tun. The latter filed an action to gain the possession of the property before the CFI and decided in favor of Price.

            On the appeal, it was found out that the deed in favor of Katigbak had not been registered in the corresponding registry of property.

ISSUE:

            Whether the deed in favor of Katigbak with the note “ Register of Deeds, Received  December 23, 1923, Province of Leyte” can it be said to be recorded in the Registry of Deeds.

HELD:

No. the term "To register" it has been said that it means to "enter in a register; to record formally and distinctly; to enroll; to enter in a list"

The mere presentation to the office of the register of deeds of a document on which acknowledgment of receipt is written is not equivalent to recording or registering the real property. Escriche says that registration, in its juridical aspect, must be understood as the entry made in a book or public registry of deeds.

If any doubt remained on the subject, it would be dispelled by turning to Act No. 2837 amendatory of section 194 of the Administrative Code, and recalling that it is therein provided that "No instrument or deed establishing, transmitting, acknowledging, modifying or extinguishing rights with respect to real estate not registered under the provisions of Act No. 496, entitled 'The Land Registration' and its amendments, shall be valid, except as between the parties thereto, until such instrument or deed has been registered, in the manner hereinafter prescribed, in the office of the register of deeds for the province or city where the real estate lies."

Hence, since the deed made by Gabino in favor of Katigbak was not only not first recorded in the registry of deeds but never legally so recorded, and since the purchaser who did record his deed was Price, who secured a Torrens title and transferred the same to the Province of Leyte, that Po Sun Tun, the holder of a defeasible title, has no legal rights as against Price and the Province of Leyte, the holders of indefeasible titles. Further, it could beruled that within the meaning of section 38 of the Land Registration Law, Price and the Province of Leyte are innocent purchasers for value of the disputed property.

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REYNALDO and NANCY RODRIGUEZ vs. CONCORDIA ONG LIM, et al.

REYNALDO and NANCY RODRIGUEZ vs. CONCORDIA ONG LIM, et al.

   November 17, 2017       FJ

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REYNALDO and NANCY RODRIGUEZ vs. CONCORDIA ONG LIM, et al.

G.R. NO. 135817

NOVEMBER 30, 2006

PONENTE: CALLEJO, SR., J.

FACTS:

Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. filed with the RTC a complaint for cancellation of COT and injunction against the spouses Rodriguez with the allegation that his mother, Dominga Goyma, was the owner of two parcels of land, registered in her name on February 6, 1948. One of the subject lands is situated in the Pagbilao, Quezon, and the other in the Atimonan, Quezon. Pablo claimed that he exclusively possessed the same until her death on July 19, 1971.

Pablo claimed that he succeeded to all her rights of ownership and possession after her death. However, the spouses Rodriguez, despite their knowledge that the son was now the owner and possessor, allegedly unlawfully and fraudulently made it appear that they had purchased the subject lots from persons who were not the owners thereof.

The spouses Rodriguez allegedly caused the cancellation of TCT despite the fact that the owner's duplicate copy was in the possession of Pablo. A TCT was issued in the name of Frisco Gudani, estranged husband of Dominga. This title was cancelled by another TCT issued in the name of Eduardo Victa, and again, was cancelled by another TCT issued in the name of the spouses Rodriguez, All the the aforementioned TCTs were issued on February 10, 1975.

On the other hand, the spouses Rodriguez alleged that Dominga was not the mother of Pablo. They averred that the subject lots were the conjugal property of Frisco and Dominga, when the latter died, Frisco was her sole surviving heir. Thereafter, Frisco allegedly sold the subject lots to Eduardo who, in turn, sold the same to the spouses Rodriguez. The latter claimed that they were purchasers in good faith and for value.

            On September 8, 1988, in the course of the trial, Pablo died and was duly substituted by his spouse, Concordia Ong Lim and children.

            A deposition of Frisco was taken on October 22, 1977, which stated, that Frisco was married to Dominga, after 11 months, they separated and the former left the conjugal dwelling. He knows that Dominga died and that Pablo is her son. Atty. Alejandro Aguilan, who helped him prepared an affidavit, asked him to signed it otherwise the property he will receive will be forfeited in favour of the government. He does not know anything about the parcels of land. The lawyer took advantage of Frisco and persuaded him to agree to the transactions.

            Thereafter, the RTC held in favor of Pablo. CA affirmed the lower court’s decision

ISSUE:

            Whether the  principle of idefeasibility of title applies to this case.

HELD:

No. Spouses cannot raise the defense of indefeasibility of a Torrens title with respect to TCT because "the principle of indefeasibility of a Torrens title does not apply where fraud attended the issuance of the title. The Torrens title does not furnish a shield for fraud."

They cannot deny any knowledge of the fraud that attended the transactions involving the subject lots, including their acquisition thereof. Stated differently, petitioners cannot claim that they were purchasers in good faith and for value because the transactions involving the subject lots were so replete with badges of fraud and irregularities that should have put them on guard about the defects in the respective titles of Frisco and Eduardo.

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HEIRS OF TAMA TAN BUTO, represented by JAYNOL TAMA TAN BUTO vs. ERNESTO LUY

HEIRS OF TAMA TAN BUTO, represented by JAYNOL TAMA TAN BUTO vs. ERNESTO LUY

   November 17, 2017       FJ

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HEIRS OF TAMA TAN BUTO, represented by JAYNOL TAMA TAN BUTO vs. ERNESTO LUY

G.R. NO. 149609

July 20, 2007

PONENTE: NACHURA, J.

FACTS:

A land located at General Santos City was originally formed part of the property and was applied for registration on August 11, 1954 by Datu Tama Tan Buto. He claims that he inherited the land from his late father who was in possession thereof continuously, publicly and exclusively in the concept of an owner, long before the end of the Spanish regime.

The land subject of Buto's application is identical to Lot 3 of the approved plan of the Makar Townsite covered by Sales Patent and OCT in the name of Eligio T. Leyva. The Director of Lands and Leyva opposed to the application, as for the former, he contended that subject property forms part of the public domain and while on Leyva’s part, because he was the registered owner of the land, as evidenced by OCT.

On February 27, 1961, the CFI decided to grant the application for registration of the land in the name of Buto due to the finding of fraud in the procurement of the sales patent by Leyva.

On March 15, 1968, the CA reversed the decision of the lower court and held that Buto failed to pursue the remedies available to him as a person aggrieved by registration of a land under Act No. 496, which is to file a petition for review within one (1) year from the issuance of a decree of registration obtained by fraud; or to institute an ordinary action for the cancellation and/or reconveyance of title. Buto, instead of filing the appropriate remedy provided for by law, instituted an application for registration of land previously registered.

On April 13, 1989, Ernesto Luy purchased a parcel of land under TCT No. 34648 located at General Santos City from Eligio Leyva. On account of the sale the TCT No. T-34648 was cancelled and on April 19, 1989, the TCT No. T-35185 was issued to Luy.

On December 14, 2000, the RTC order the cancellation of Luy’s COT and directed the issuance of a writ placing the heirs of Buto in possession of the subject land. The CA, however, granted the petition for the annulment of the resolution of the lower court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the heirs of Buto are barred by res judicata

HELD:

Yes, the heirs of Buto can no longer question the 1968 decision of the CA which has long become final and executory. All the requisites of res judicata are present in the case at bar.

The requisites of res judicata are:

(a) The former judgment must be final;

(b) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;

(c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and

(d) there must be, between the first and the second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter, and of cause of action.

The CFI has no jurisdiction to decree again the registration of land already decreed in an earlier land registration case and a second decree for the same land is null and void. This is so, because when once decreed by a court of competent jurisdiction, the title to the land thus determined is already a res judicata binding on the whole world, the proceeding being in rem. The court has no power in a subsequent proceeding (not based on fraud and within the statutory period) to adjudicate the same title in favor of another person.

Furthermore, the registration of the property in the name of the first registered owner in the Registration Book is a standing notice to the world that said property is already registered in his name.

Moreover, another reason why the Court can no longer entertain the present petition is because after the expiration of one (1) year from the issuance of the decree of registration, the certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears thereon. The After the COT was issued to Leyva on November 27, 1953; it attained the status of indefeasibility one year after its issuance. From the finality of 1968 CA’s decision, any other attack on the certificate of title issued to Leyva must fail.

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D’ORO LAND REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT vs. NILA CLAUNAN, et al.

D’ORO LAND REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT vs. NILA CLAUNAN, et al.

   November 17, 2017       FJ

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D’ORO LAND REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT vs. NILA CLAUNAN, et al.

G.R. NO. 169447

February 26, 2007

PONENTE: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

FACTS:

Three parcels of land situated in Lapasan, CDO City owned by Chacon Enterprises Inc. and were later sold to D’oro and the Regalados sometime in the early 1990’s. On September 9, 1992, a TCT were issued in the name of D’oro for Lots 2-A and 2-B while the Regalados were issued TCT for Lot 2-C, which was also purchased by the former.

Thereafter, D’oro caused a relocation survey to be conducted and confirmed that there were about 34 houses sporadically erected on the lots. Apparently, certain individuals surreptitiously entered the properties and introduced improvements thereon. After demands to vacate went unheeded, D’oro filed an action for recovery of possession and damages against more than 50 individuals who refused to surrender possession of the lots.

The respondents alleged that they entered the lots between the years 1970 to 1982; that their occupation of the lots has been continuous, undisturbed, public and adverse and has therefore ripened into ownership; that whatever rights petitioner had over the lots were barred by laches. In support of their claim, they presented a Certification issued on June 11, 1984 by Forest Guards and approved by District Forester, that the lots were alienable and disposable land of the State. According to respondents, the lots were marshy, swampy, surrounded by "piyapi" trees and without improvements when they occupied the same.

The trial court dismissed the complaint and held that while the respondents could not acquire title to the registered lots in derogation of that of D’ore through prescription, the latter's claim was nonetheless barred by laches. The CA affirmed the decision of the lower court in toto.

Now, D’oro appealed before the SC, mainly contends that laches could not bar its claim over the subject lots since respondents had no colorable title or any valid claim of ownership to it because they are mere squatters whose possession of the lots, no matter how long, could not prevail over petitioner's certificate of title.

ISSUE:

Whether the respondents’ length of possession meet the jurisprudential standards for laches to set in.

HELD:

No, in the jurisprudence, Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier.

The elements of laches are:

(1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation that led to the complaint and for which the complaint seeks a remedy;

(2) delay in asserting the complainant's rights, having had knowledge or notice of the defendant's conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit;

(3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right on which he bases his suit; and

(4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held barred.

In the present case, the third and fourth elements of laches are absent.

Moreover, the respondents knew that they did not own the lots and concluded, on the basis of a certification issued by the Bureau of Forest Development, that the lots were government-owned. Regardless of the nature of the lots' ownership, however, the fact remains that respondents entered the properties without permission from the owner. Notwithstanding the length of time that they may have physically occupied the lots; they are deemed to have entered the same in bad faith, such that the nature of their possession is presumed to have retained the same character throughout their occupancy.

Hence, since respondents' "adverse, open and notorious possession" of the lots cannot defeat the title of Chacon Enterprises Inc., the former did not acquire any superior possessory right over the lots D’ore thus acquired a clean title from Chacon Enterprises Inc. and is not barred from recovering possession of the lots from respondents. 

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DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. COURT OF APPEALS

DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. COURT OF APPEALS

   November 17, 2017       FJ

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DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. NO. 83609

OCTOBER 26, 1989

PONENTE: GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.

FACTS:

           

On July 20, 1976, Ibarra and Amelia Bisnar, the private respondents, claimed to be the owners of two parcels of lands situated in Capiz and filed a joint application for registration of title to the said lands.

On December 16, 1976, the Director of Lands and Bureau of Forest Development opposed the application on the grounds that the respondents were not applicants neither predecessors-in-interest to possess sufficient title to acquire ownership and that the lands in question are a portion of the public domain belonging to the State.

On February 24, 1977, the respondents filed an amended application which was approved on March 14, 1977.

The CFI of Capiz held on granting the application for confirmation and registration of the two parcels of land filed by private respondents. It found that applicants and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, public, continuous, peaceful and adverse possession of the subject parcels of land under bona fide claims of ownership for more than eighty (80) years (not only 30) prior to the filing of the application for registration, introduced improvements on the lands by planting coconuts, bamboos and other plants, and converted a part of the land into productive fishponds.

The respondent court affirmed the decision in toto, and it held that the classification of the lots as timberland by the Director of Forestry cannot prevail in the absence of proof that the said lots are indeed more valuable as forest land than as agricultural land. Thereafter, the Director of Lands through the OSG filed a petition before this Court for the review of the said decision.

ISSUE:           

Whether the lots in question may be registered under Section 48(b) of CA 141

HELD:

No. The lots cannot be registered under Section 48(b) of CA 141.

A positive act of the government is needed to declassify land which is classified as forest and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. A parcel of forest land is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry and beyond the power and jurisdiction of the cadastral court to register under the Torrens System

Hence, Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, applies exclusively to public agricultural land. Forest lands or areas covered with forests are excluded.

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