Friday, November 17

REYNALDO and NANCY RODRIGUEZ vs. CONCORDIA ONG LIM, et al.


REYNALDO and NANCY RODRIGUEZ vs. CONCORDIA ONG LIM, et al.
G.R. NO. 135817
NOVEMBER 30, 2006

PONENTE: CALLEJO, SR., J.

FACTS:

Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. filed with the RTC a complaint for cancellation of COT and injunction against the spouses Rodriguez with the allegation that his mother, Dominga Goyma, was the owner of two parcels of land, registered in her name on February 6, 1948. One of the subject lands is situated in the Pagbilao, Quezon, and the other in the Atimonan, Quezon. Pablo claimed that he exclusively possessed the same until her death on July 19, 1971.

Pablo claimed that he succeeded to all her rights of ownership and possession after her death. However, the spouses Rodriguez, despite their knowledge that the son was now the owner and possessor, allegedly unlawfully and fraudulently made it appear that they had purchased the subject lots from persons who were not the owners thereof.

The spouses Rodriguez allegedly caused the cancellation of TCT despite the fact that the owner's duplicate copy was in the possession of Pablo. A TCT was issued in the name of Frisco Gudani, estranged husband of Dominga. This title was cancelled by another TCT issued in the name of Eduardo Victa, and again, was cancelled by another TCT issued in the name of the spouses Rodriguez, All the the aforementioned TCTs were issued on February 10, 1975.

On the other hand, the spouses Rodriguez alleged that Dominga was not the mother of Pablo. They averred that the subject lots were the conjugal property of Frisco and Dominga, when the latter died, Frisco was her sole surviving heir. Thereafter, Frisco allegedly sold the subject lots to Eduardo who, in turn, sold the same to the spouses Rodriguez. The latter claimed that they were purchasers in good faith and for value.

            On September 8, 1988, in the course of the trial, Pablo died and was duly substituted by his spouse, Concordia Ong Lim and children.

            A deposition of Frisco was taken on October 22, 1977, which stated, that Frisco was married to Dominga, after 11 months, they separated and the former left the conjugal dwelling. He knows that Dominga died and that Pablo is her son. Atty. Alejandro Aguilan, who helped him prepared an affidavit, asked him to signed it otherwise the property he will receive will be forfeited in favour of the government. He does not know anything about the parcels of land. The lawyer took advantage of Frisco and persuaded him to agree to the transactions.

            Thereafter, the RTC held in favor of Pablo. CA affirmed the lower court’s decision

ISSUE:

            Whether the  principle of idefeasibility of title applies to this case.

HELD:

No. Spouses cannot raise the defense of indefeasibility of a Torrens title with respect to TCT because "the principle of indefeasibility of a Torrens title does not apply where fraud attended the issuance of the title. The Torrens title does not furnish a shield for fraud."

They cannot deny any knowledge of the fraud that attended the transactions involving the subject lots, including their acquisition thereof. Stated differently, petitioners cannot claim that they were purchasers in good faith and for value because the transactions involving the subject lots were so replete with badges of fraud and irregularities that should have put them on guard about the defects in the respective titles of Frisco and Eduardo.

HEIRS OF TAMA TAN BUTO, represented by JAYNOL TAMA TAN BUTO vs. ERNESTO LUY


HEIRS OF TAMA TAN BUTO, represented by JAYNOL TAMA TAN BUTO vs. ERNESTO LUY
G.R. NO. 149609
July 20, 2007

PONENTE: NACHURA, J.


FACTS:

A land located at General Santos City was originally formed part of the property and was applied for registration on August 11, 1954 by Datu Tama Tan Buto. He claims that he inherited the land from his late father who was in possession thereof continuously, publicly and exclusively in the concept of an owner, long before the end of the Spanish regime.

The land subject of Buto's application is identical to Lot 3 of the approved plan of the Makar Townsite covered by Sales Patent and OCT in the name of Eligio T. Leyva. The Director of Lands and Leyva opposed to the application, as for the former, he contended that subject property forms part of the public domain and while on Leyva’s part, because he was the registered owner of the land, as evidenced by OCT.

On February 27, 1961, the CFI decided to grant the application for registration of the land in the name of Buto due to the finding of fraud in the procurement of the sales patent by Leyva.

On March 15, 1968, the CA reversed the decision of the lower court and held that Buto failed to pursue the remedies available to him as a person aggrieved by registration of a land under Act No. 496, which is to file a petition for review within one (1) year from the issuance of a decree of registration obtained by fraud; or to institute an ordinary action for the cancellation and/or reconveyance of title. Buto, instead of filing the appropriate remedy provided for by law, instituted an application for registration of land previously registered.

On April 13, 1989, Ernesto Luy purchased a parcel of land under TCT No. 34648 located at General Santos City from Eligio Leyva. On account of the sale the TCT No. T-34648 was cancelled and on April 19, 1989, the TCT No. T-35185 was issued to Luy.

On December 14, 2000, the RTC order the cancellation of Luy’s COT and directed the issuance of a writ placing the heirs of Buto in possession of the subject land. The CA, however, granted the petition for the annulment of the resolution of the lower court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the heirs of Buto are barred by res judicata

HELD:

Yes, the heirs of Buto can no longer question the 1968 decision of the CA which has long become final and executory. All the requisites of res judicata are present in the case at bar.

The requisites of res judicata are:

(a) The former judgment must be final;
(b) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
(c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and
(d) there must be, between the first and the second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter, and of cause of action.

The CFI has no jurisdiction to decree again the registration of land already decreed in an earlier land registration case and a second decree for the same land is null and void. This is so, because when once decreed by a court of competent jurisdiction, the title to the land thus determined is already a res judicata binding on the whole world, the proceeding being in rem. The court has no power in a subsequent proceeding (not based on fraud and within the statutory period) to adjudicate the same title in favor of another person.

Furthermore, the registration of the property in the name of the first registered owner in the Registration Book is a standing notice to the world that said property is already registered in his name.

Moreover, another reason why the Court can no longer entertain the present petition is because after the expiration of one (1) year from the issuance of the decree of registration, the certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears thereon. The After the COT was issued to Leyva on November 27, 1953; it attained the status of indefeasibility one year after its issuance. From the finality of 1968 CA’s decision, any other attack on the certificate of title issued to Leyva must fail.

D’ORO LAND REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT vs. NILA CLAUNAN, et al.


D’ORO LAND REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT vs. NILA CLAUNAN, et al.
G.R. NO. 169447
February 26, 2007

PONENTE: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

FACTS:

Three parcels of land situated in Lapasan, CDO City owned by Chacon Enterprises Inc. and were later sold to D’oro and the Regalados sometime in the early 1990’s. On September 9, 1992, a TCT were issued in the name of D’oro for Lots 2-A and 2-B while the Regalados were issued TCT for Lot 2-C, which was also purchased by the former.

Thereafter, D’oro caused a relocation survey to be conducted and confirmed that there were about 34 houses sporadically erected on the lots. Apparently, certain individuals surreptitiously entered the properties and introduced improvements thereon. After demands to vacate went unheeded, D’oro filed an action for recovery of possession and damages against more than 50 individuals who refused to surrender possession of the lots.

The respondents alleged that they entered the lots between the years 1970 to 1982; that their occupation of the lots has been continuous, undisturbed, public and adverse and has therefore ripened into ownership; that whatever rights petitioner had over the lots were barred by laches. In support of their claim, they presented a Certification issued on June 11, 1984 by Forest Guards and approved by District Forester, that the lots were alienable and disposable land of the State. According to respondents, the lots were marshy, swampy, surrounded by "piyapi" trees and without improvements when they occupied the same.

The trial court dismissed the complaint and held that while the respondents could not acquire title to the registered lots in derogation of that of D’ore through prescription, the latter's claim was nonetheless barred by laches. The CA affirmed the decision of the lower court in toto.

Now, D’oro appealed before the SC, mainly contends that laches could not bar its claim over the subject lots since respondents had no colorable title or any valid claim of ownership to it because they are mere squatters whose possession of the lots, no matter how long, could not prevail over petitioner's certificate of title.

ISSUE:

Whether the respondents’ length of possession meet the jurisprudential standards for laches to set in.

HELD:

No, in the jurisprudence, Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier.

The elements of laches are:

(1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation that led to the complaint and for which the complaint seeks a remedy;
(2) delay in asserting the complainant's rights, having had knowledge or notice of the defendant's conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit;
(3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right on which he bases his suit; and
(4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held barred.

In the present case, the third and fourth elements of laches are absent.

Moreover, the respondents knew that they did not own the lots and concluded, on the basis of a certification issued by the Bureau of Forest Development, that the lots were government-owned. Regardless of the nature of the lots' ownership, however, the fact remains that respondents entered the properties without permission from the owner. Notwithstanding the length of time that they may have physically occupied the lots; they are deemed to have entered the same in bad faith, such that the nature of their possession is presumed to have retained the same character throughout their occupancy.

Hence, since respondents' "adverse, open and notorious possession" of the lots cannot defeat the title of Chacon Enterprises Inc., the former did not acquire any superior possessory right over the lots D’ore thus acquired a clean title from Chacon Enterprises Inc. and is not barred from recovering possession of the lots from respondents. 

DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. COURT OF APPEALS


DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. 83609
OCTOBER 26, 1989

PONENTE: GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.

FACTS:
           
On July 20, 1976, Ibarra and Amelia Bisnar, the private respondents, claimed to be the owners of two parcels of lands situated in Capiz and filed a joint application for registration of title to the said lands.

On December 16, 1976, the Director of Lands and Bureau of Forest Development opposed the application on the grounds that the respondents were not applicants neither predecessors-in-interest to possess sufficient title to acquire ownership and that the lands in question are a portion of the public domain belonging to the State.

On February 24, 1977, the respondents filed an amended application which was approved on March 14, 1977.

The CFI of Capiz held on granting the application for confirmation and registration of the two parcels of land filed by private respondents. It found that applicants and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, public, continuous, peaceful and adverse possession of the subject parcels of land under bona fide claims of ownership for more than eighty (80) years (not only 30) prior to the filing of the application for registration, introduced improvements on the lands by planting coconuts, bamboos and other plants, and converted a part of the land into productive fishponds.

The respondent court affirmed the decision in toto, and it held that the classification of the lots as timberland by the Director of Forestry cannot prevail in the absence of proof that the said lots are indeed more valuable as forest land than as agricultural land. Thereafter, the Director of Lands through the OSG filed a petition before this Court for the review of the said decision.

ISSUE:           

Whether the lots in question may be registered under Section 48(b) of CA 141

HELD:

No. The lots cannot be registered under Section 48(b) of CA 141.

A positive act of the government is needed to declassify land which is classified as forest and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. A parcel of forest land is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry and beyond the power and jurisdiction of the cadastral court to register under the Torrens System


Hence, Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, applies exclusively to public agricultural land. Forest lands or areas covered with forests are excluded.

Monday, October 23

Human Rights (Section 17-19, Article XIII)



HUMAN RIGHTS (SECTION 17-19, ARTICLE XIII - THE 1987 PHILIPPINES CONSTITUTION)

SECTION 17. (1) There is hereby created an independent office called the Commission on Human Rights.

(2) The Commission shall be composed of a Chairman and four Members who must be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and a majority of whom shall be members of the Bar. The term of office and other qualifications and disabilities of the Members of the Commission shall be provided by law.

(3) Until this Commission is constituted, the existing Presidential Committee on Human Rights shall continue to exercise its present functions and powers.

(4) The approved annual appropriations of the Commission shall be automatically and regularly released.

SECTION 18. The Commission on Human Rights shall have the following powers and functions:

(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights;

(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court;

(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection;

(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;

(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to enhance respect for the primacy of human rights;

(6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human rights and to provide for compensation to victims of violations of human rights, or their families;

(7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty obligations on human rights;

(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its authority;

(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions;

(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and

(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.


SECTION 19. The Congress may provide for other cases of violations of human rights that should fall within the authority of the Commission, taking into account its recommendations.


1.      WHAT ARE THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS?

¾     Under the Section 18, Article XIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, here are the following  powers and functions of the Commission on Human Rights:

1)     Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights;
2)     Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court;
3)     Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection;
4)     Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;
5)     Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to enhance respect for the primacy of human rights;
6)     Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human rights and to provide for compensation to victims of violations of human rights, or their families;
7)     Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty obligations on human rights;
8)     Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its authority;
9)     Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions;
10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and
11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.

2.      WHAT IS YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF “RIGHT TO LIFE”

a.      AS A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT?

¾     Under the Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, here in: “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.”  It is important to note that the chorological order of the terms LIFE, LIBERTY and PROPERTY is necessary. It is mandated under this provision that the State must see to it, to protect and secure the life. The other rights will be meaningless without the right to life.

b.      AS A HUMAN BEING?

¾     Right to life is the main element to consider specie, a human being. Under the Article 41 of the New Civil Code, in order to be considered a person, “For civil purposes, the foetus is considered born if it is alive at the time it is completely delivered from the mother's womb. However, if the foetus had an intra-uterine life of less than seven months, it is not deemed born if it dies within twenty-four hours after its complete delivery from the maternal womb.”

3.      ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE 2018 BUDGET OF THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS IS REDUCED TO PHP 1,000.00 A YEAR, WHAT WOULD BE YOUR LEGAL ARGUMENT?



¾     It is UNCONSTITUTIONAL to reduce to Php 1,000.00 the annual budget of the Commission on Human Rights. It violates the Section 17(4), Article XIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, which herein provides, “The approved annual appropriations of the Commission shall be automatically and regularly released.” Under this provision, the budget may be increase but not decrease to the point that it will affect the Commission on Human Rights to perform its powers and functions properly.

Disini vs. Sandiganbayan


HERMINIO DISINI vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. NO. 169823 SEPTEMBER 11, 2003



PLEASE NOTE THAT YOU ARE PRESUMED THAT YOU HAVE READ THE ORIGINAL TEXT OF THE CASE. THIS IS FOR THE PURPOSE OF REVIEW. *Read at your own risk* :)


FACTS:
·         June 30, 2004 – Office of the OMB  SB-  2 information against Herminio Disini – corruption of public officials, Art 212 in rel. to Art 210 (RPC) and violation of RA 3019
    Conspiring together and confederating with former Pres. Marcos
    Taking advantage of close personal relation, intimacy and free access
·         Aug. 2 – Disini MTQ – crim actions has been extinguished by PRESCRIPTION and information do not conform to the prescribed form OPPOSED
·         Sept. 16 – Disini VOLUNTARY SUBMISSION for arraignment  Plea of NOT GUILTY to obtain the SB’s favorable action on his Motion for permission to travel abroad
·         Jan. 17, 2005 – SB DENIED DISINI  MR DENIED
·         (Disini’s) ➜ challenged the jurisdiction of SB ➜ information did NOT allege that the charges were being filed pursuant to and in connection with EO 1, 2, 14, 14-01; (2) allegations neither pertained to the recovery of ill-gotten wealth nor involved sequestration cases; (3) cases filed by the OMB instead of PCGG; (4) private individual, NOT charged as co-principal, accomplice, accessory of a public officers, should be in regular courts.

HELD: SB has OEJ over the offense charged
·         SG ➜ SB has jurisdiction over the offense charged because the crim cases were filed within the purview of SEC. 4(C) of RA 8242 and both complaints were initially filed by the PCGG pursuant to its mandate.
    He is involved in the same transaction, specifically the contacts awarded through his and Marcos’ intervention in favor of Burns and Rose to do engineering and architectural design, and Westinghouse to do the construction of the PNPPP.
    Sec. 2, EO 1
·         The offense have NOT yet prescribed
·         In resolving the issue of prescription, the ff. must be considered:
1)     The period of prescription for the offense;
2)     The time when the period of prescriptions starts to run; and
3)     The time when the prescriptive period is interrupted.

·         GR: prescriptive period shall commence to run on the day the crime is committed.
ETR: “BLAMELESS IGNORANCE” DOCTRINE
            (Incorporated in SEC. 2, ACT 3326)

- The statute of limitations runs only upon discovery of the fact of the invasion of a right which will support a cause of action.
- In other words, the court would decline to apply the statute of limitations where the plaintiff does not know or has no reasonable means of knowing the existence of the cause of action.

    Penalty of the offense charged = PRISION MAYOR
    Period of prescription = 15 YRS.
   Began to run = Discovery = 1986
    Interrupted from April 8, 1991 (transmission of the records from PCGG to OMB)

HENCE, 5YRS. from 1986.




OTHER NOTES:

Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Prosecution of Offenses; Prescription of Offenses; ACtions; The filing of the criminal complaints in the Office of the Ombudsman effectively interrupted the running of the period of prescription.

We note, too, that the criminal complaints were filed and their records transmitted by the PCGG to the Office of the Ombudsman on April 8, 1991 for the conduct the preliminary investigation.In accordance with Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code and the ruling in Panaguiton, Jr. v. Department of Justice, the filing of the criminal complaints in the Office of the Ombudsman effectively interrupted the running of the period of prescription.

Criminal ProcedureIrrespective of whether the offense charged is punishable by the Revised Penal Code or by a special law, it is the filing of the complaint or information in the office of the public prosecutor for purposes of the preliminary investigation that interrupts the period of prescription. 

The prevailing rule is, therefore, that irrespective of whether the offense charged is punishable by the Revised Penal Code or by a special law, it is the filing of the complaint or information in the office of the public prosecutor for purposes of the preliminary investigation that interrupts the period of prescription. Consequently, prescription did not yet set in because only five years elapsed from 1986, the time of the discovery of the offenses charged, up to April 1991, the time of the filing of the criminal complaints in the Office of the Ombudsman.\

Criminal Procedure; A complaint or information must state every single fact necessary to constitute the offense charged; otherwise, a motion to dismiss or to quash on the ground that the complaint or information charges no offense may be properly sustained. 


It is axiomatic that a complaint or information must state every single fact necessary to constitute the offense charged; otherwise, a motion to dismiss or to quash on the ground that the complaint or information charges no offense may be properly sustained. The fundamental test in determining whether a motion to quash may be sustained based on this ground is whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, will establish the essential elements of the offense as defined in the law. Extrinsic matters or evidence aliunde are not considered. The test does not require absolute certainty as to the presence of the elements of the offense; otherwise, there would no longer be any need for the Prosecution to proceed to trial.

Ill-Gotten Wealth; PCGG; Section 2, E.O. No. 1, which tasked the PCGG with assisting the President in “[t]he recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including the takeover or sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them, during his administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public office and/or using their powers, authority, influence, connections or relationship,” expressly granted the authority of the PCGG to recover ill-gotten wealth covered President Marcos’ immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, without distinction as to their private or public status.


That Disini was a private individual did not remove the offenses charged from the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Section 2 of E.O. No. 1, which tasked the PCGG with assisting the President in “[t]he recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including the takeover or sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them, during his administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public office and/or using their powers, authority, influence, connections or relationship,” expressly granted the authority of the PCGG to recover ill-gotten wealth covered President Marcos’ immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, without distinction as to their private or public status.

Criminal Law; Corruption of Public Officers; Penalties; The crime of corruption of public officials charged in Criminal Case No. 28001 is punished by Article 212 of the Revised Penal Code with the “same penalties imposed upon the officer corrupted.”

Under the second paragraph of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code (direct bribery), if the gift was accepted by the officer in consideration of the execution of an act that does not constitute a crime, and the officer executes the act, he shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its medium and minimum periods and a fine of not less than three times the value of the gift. Conformably with Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, the period of prescription for this specie of corruption of public officials charged against Disini is 15 years.

Criminal Law; Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019); By express provision of Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, the offenses committed under R.A. No. 3019 shall prescribe in 15 years.

As for Criminal Case No. 28002, Disini was charged with a violation of Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019. By express provision of Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, the offenses committed under R.A. No. 3019 shall prescribe in 15 years. Prior to the amendment, the prescriptive period was only 10 years. It became settled in People v. Pacificador, however, that the longer prescriptive period of 15 years would not apply to crimes committed prior to the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, which was approved on March 16, 1982, because the longer period could not be given retroactive effect for not being favorable to the accused. With the information alleging the period from 1974 to February 1986 as the time of the commission of the crime charged, the applicable prescriptive period is 10 years in order to accord with People v. Pacificador.

Ill-Gotten Wealth; During the Marcos regime, no person would have dared to assail the legality of the transactions, it would be unreasonable to expect that the discovery of the unlawful transactions was possible prior to 1986.

Accordingly, we are not persuaded to hold here that the prescriptive period began to run from 1974, the time when the contracts for the PNPP Project were awarded to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse. Although the criminal cases were the offshoot of the sequestration case to recover ill-gotten wealth instead of behest loans like in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto, the connivance and conspiracy among the public officials involved and the beneficiaries of the favors illegally extended rendered it similarly well-nigh impossible for the State, as the aggrieved party, to have known of the commission of the crimes charged prior to the EDSA Revolution in 1986. Notwithstanding the highly publicized and widely-known nature of the PNPPP, the unlawful acts or transactions in relation to it were discovered only through the PCGG’s exhaustive investigation, resulting in the establishment of a prima facie case sufficient for the PCGG to institute Civil Case No. 0013 against Disini. Before the discovery, the PNPPP contracts, which partook of a public character, enjoyed the presumption of their execution having been regularly done in the course of official functions. Considering further that during the Marcos regime, no person would have dared to assail the legality of the transactions, it would be unreasonable to expect that the discovery of the unlawful transactions was possible prior to 1986.

Criminal Law; Corruption of Public Officials; Elements of.

The elements of corruption of public officials under Article 212 of the Revised Penal Code are:

  1. That the offender makes offers or promises, or gives gifts or presents to a public officer; and
  2. That the offers or promises are made or the gifts or presents are given to a public officer under circumstances that will make the public officer liable for direct bribery or indirect bribery.

The allegations in the information for corruption of public officials, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the crime. The information stated that: (1) Disini made an offer and promise, and gave gifts to President Marcos, a public officer; and (2) in consideration of the offers, promises and gifts, President Marcos, in causing the award of the contracts to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse by taking advantage of his position and in committing said act in relation to his office, was placed under circumstances that would make him liable for direct bribery. The second element of corruption of public officers simply required the public officer to be placed under circumstances, not absolute certainty, that would make him liable for direct or indirect bribery. Thus, even without alleging that President Marcos received or accepted Disini’s offers, promises and gifts – an essential element in direct bribery – the allegation that President Marcos caused the award of the contracts to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse sufficed to place him under circumstances of being liable for direct bribery.

Criminal; Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019); Elements of the offense under Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019.

The sufficiency of the allegations in the information charging the violation of Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019 is similarly upheld. The elements of the offense under Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019 are:
  1. That the offender has family or close personal relation with a public official;
  2. That he capitalizes or exploits or takes advantage of such family or close personal relation by directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any present, gift, material or pecuniary advantage from any person having some business, transaction, application, request, or contract with the government;
  3. That the public official with whom the offender has family or close personal relation has to intervene in the business transaction, application, request, or contract with the government.