Human Rights (Section 17-19, Article XIII)

Human Rights (Section 17-19, Article XIII)

   October 23, 2017       FJ

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HUMAN RIGHTS (SECTION 17-19, ARTICLE XIII - THE 1987 PHILIPPINES CONSTITUTION)

SECTION 17. (1) There is hereby created an independent office called the Commission on Human Rights.

(2) The Commission shall be composed of a Chairman and four Members who must be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and a majority of whom shall be members of the Bar. The term of office and other qualifications and disabilities of the Members of the Commission shall be provided by law.

(3) Until this Commission is constituted, the existing Presidential Committee on Human Rights shall continue to exercise its present functions and powers.

(4) The approved annual appropriations of the Commission shall be automatically and regularly released.

SECTION 18. The Commission on Human Rights shall have the following powers and functions:

(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights;

(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court;

(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection;

(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;

(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to enhance respect for the primacy of human rights;

(6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human rights and to provide for compensation to victims of violations of human rights, or their families;

(7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty obligations on human rights;

(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its authority;

(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions;

(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and

(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.


SECTION 19. The Congress may provide for other cases of violations of human rights that should fall within the authority of the Commission, taking into account its recommendations.

1.      WHAT ARE THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS?

¾     Under the Section 18, Article XIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, here are the following  powers and functions of the Commission on Human Rights:

1)     Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights;

2)     Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court;

3)     Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection;

4)     Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;

5)     Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to enhance respect for the primacy of human rights;

6)     Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human rights and to provide for compensation to victims of violations of human rights, or their families;

7)     Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty obligations on human rights;

8)     Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its authority;

9)     Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions;

10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and

11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.

2.      WHAT IS YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF “RIGHT TO LIFE”

a.      AS A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT?

¾     Under the Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, here in: “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.”  It is important to note that the chorological order of the terms LIFE, LIBERTY and PROPERTY is necessary. It is mandated under this provision that the State must see to it, to protect and secure the life. The other rights will be meaningless without the right to life.

b.      AS A HUMAN BEING?

¾     Right to life is the main element to consider specie, a human being. Under the Article 41 of the New Civil Code, in order to be considered a person, “For civil purposes, the foetus is considered born if it is alive at the time it is completely delivered from the mother's womb. However, if the foetus had an intra-uterine life of less than seven months, it is not deemed born if it dies within twenty-four hours after its complete delivery from the maternal womb.”

3.      ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE 2018 BUDGET OF THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS IS REDUCED TO PHP 1,000.00 A YEAR, WHAT WOULD BE YOUR LEGAL ARGUMENT?

¾     It is UNCONSTITUTIONAL to reduce to Php 1,000.00 the annual budget of the Commission on Human Rights. It violates the Section 17(4), Article XIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, which herein provides, “The approved annual appropriations of the Commission shall be automatically and regularly released.” Under this provision, the budget may be increase but not decrease to the point that it will affect the Commission on Human Rights to perform its powers and functions properly.

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Disini vs. Sandiganbayan

Disini vs. Sandiganbayan

   October 23, 2017       FJ

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HERMINIO DISINI vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. NO. 169823 SEPTEMBER 11, 2003

PLEASE NOTE THAT YOU ARE PRESUMED THAT YOU HAVE READ THE ORIGINAL TEXT OF THE CASE. THIS IS FOR THE PURPOSE OF REVIEW. *Read at your own risk* :)

FACTS:

·         June 30, 2004 – Office of the OMB ➜ SB-  2 information against Herminio Disini – corruption of public officials, Art 212 in rel. to Art 210 (RPC) and violation of RA 3019

➤    Conspiring together and confederating with former Pres. Marcos

➤    Taking advantage of close personal relation, intimacy and free access

·         Aug. 2 – Disini ➜MTQ – crim actions has been extinguished by PRESCRIPTION and information do not conform to the prescribed form ➜OPPOSED

·         Sept. 16 – Disini ➜VOLUNTARY SUBMISSION for arraignment ➜ Plea of NOT GUILTY ➜to obtain the SB’s favorable action on his Motion for permission to travel abroad

·         Jan. 17, 2005 – SB ➜DENIED ➜DISINI ➜ MR ➜DENIED

·         (Disini’s) ➜ challenged the jurisdiction of SB ➜ information did NOT allege that the charges were being filed pursuant to and in connection with EO 1, 2, 14, 14-01; (2) allegations neither pertained to the recovery of ill-gotten wealth nor involved sequestration cases; (3) cases filed by the OMB instead of PCGG; (4) private individual, NOT charged as co-principal, accomplice, accessory of a public officers, should be in regular courts.

HELD: SB has OEJ over the offense charged

·         SG ➜ SB has jurisdiction over the offense charged because the crim cases were filed within the purview of SEC. 4(C) of RA 8242 and both complaints were initially filed by the PCGG pursuant to its mandate.

➤    He is involved in the same transaction, specifically the contacts awarded through his and Marcos’ intervention in favor of Burns and Rose to do engineering and architectural design, and Westinghouse to do the construction of the PNPPP.

➤    Sec. 2, EO 1

·         The offense have NOT yet prescribed

·         In resolving the issue of prescription, the ff. must be considered:

1)     The period of prescription for the offense;

2)     The time when the period of prescriptions starts to run; and

3)     The time when the prescriptive period is interrupted.

·         GR: prescriptive period shall commence to run on the day the crime is committed.

ETR: “BLAMELESS IGNORANCE” DOCTRINE
            (Incorporated in SEC. 2, ACT 3326)

- The statute of limitations runs only upon discovery of the fact of the invasion of a right which will support a cause of action.

- In other words, the court would decline to apply the statute of limitations where the plaintiff does not know or has no reasonable means of knowing the existence of the cause of action.

➤    Penalty of the offense charged = PRISION MAYOR

➤    Period of prescription = 15 YRS.

➤   Began to run = Discovery = 1986

➤    Interrupted from April 8, 1991 (transmission of the records from PCGG to OMB)

HENCE, 5YRS. from 1986.

OTHER NOTES:

Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Prosecution of Offenses; Prescription of Offenses; ACtions; The filing of the criminal complaints in the Office of the Ombudsman effectively interrupted the running of the period of prescription.

We note, too, that the criminal complaints were filed and their records transmitted by the PCGG to the Office of the Ombudsman on April 8, 1991 for the conduct the preliminary investigation.In accordance with Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code and the ruling in Panaguiton, Jr. v. Department of Justice, the filing of the criminal complaints in the Office of the Ombudsman effectively interrupted the running of the period of prescription.

Criminal Procedure; Irrespective of whether the offense charged is punishable by the Revised Penal Code or by a special law, it is the filing of the complaint or information in the office of the public prosecutor for purposes of the preliminary investigation that interrupts the period of prescription. 

The prevailing rule is, therefore, that irrespective of whether the offense charged is punishable by the Revised Penal Code or by a special law, it is the filing of the complaint or information in the office of the public prosecutor for purposes of the preliminary investigation that interrupts the period of prescription. Consequently, prescription did not yet set in because only five years elapsed from 1986, the time of the discovery of the offenses charged, up to April 1991, the time of the filing of the criminal complaints in the Office of the Ombudsman.\

Criminal Procedure; A complaint or information must state every single fact necessary to constitute the offense charged; otherwise, a motion to dismiss or to quash on the ground that the complaint or information charges no offense may be properly sustained. 

It is axiomatic that a complaint or information must state every single fact necessary to constitute the offense charged; otherwise, a motion to dismiss or to quash on the ground that the complaint or information charges no offense may be properly sustained. The fundamental test in determining whether a motion to quash may be sustained based on this ground is whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, will establish the essential elements of the offense as defined in the law. Extrinsic matters or evidence aliunde are not considered. The test does not require absolute certainty as to the presence of the elements of the offense; otherwise, there would no longer be any need for the Prosecution to proceed to trial.

Ill-Gotten Wealth; PCGG; Section 2, E.O. No. 1, which tasked the PCGG with assisting the President in “[t]he recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including the takeover or sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them, during his administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public office and/or using their powers, authority, influence, connections or relationship,” expressly granted the authority of the PCGG to recover ill-gotten wealth covered President Marcos’ immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, without distinction as to their private or public status.

That Disini was a private individual did not remove the offenses charged from the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Section 2 of E.O. No. 1, which tasked the PCGG with assisting the President in “[t]he recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including the takeover or sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them, during his administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public office and/or using their powers, authority, influence, connections or relationship,” expressly granted the authority of the PCGG to recover ill-gotten wealth covered President Marcos’ immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, without distinction as to their private or public status.

Criminal Law; Corruption of Public Officers; Penalties; The crime of corruption of public officials charged in Criminal Case No. 28001 is punished by Article 212 of the Revised Penal Code with the “same penalties imposed upon the officer corrupted.”

Under the second paragraph of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code (direct bribery), if the gift was accepted by the officer in consideration of the execution of an act that does not constitute a crime, and the officer executes the act, he shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its medium and minimum periods and a fine of not less than three times the value of the gift. Conformably with Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, the period of prescription for this specie of corruption of public officials charged against Disini is 15 years.

Criminal Law; Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019); By express provision of Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, the offenses committed under R.A. No. 3019 shall prescribe in 15 years.

As for Criminal Case No. 28002, Disini was charged with a violation of Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019. By express provision of Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, the offenses committed under R.A. No. 3019 shall prescribe in 15 years. Prior to the amendment, the prescriptive period was only 10 years. It became settled in People v. Pacificador, however, that the longer prescriptive period of 15 years would not apply to crimes committed prior to the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, which was approved on March 16, 1982, because the longer period could not be given retroactive effect for not being favorable to the accused. With the information alleging the period from 1974 to February 1986 as the time of the commission of the crime charged, the applicable prescriptive period is 10 years in order to accord with People v. Pacificador.

Ill-Gotten Wealth; During the Marcos regime, no person would have dared to assail the legality of the transactions, it would be unreasonable to expect that the discovery of the unlawful transactions was possible prior to 1986.

Accordingly, we are not persuaded to hold here that the prescriptive period began to run from 1974, the time when the contracts for the PNPP Project were awarded to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse. Although the criminal cases were the offshoot of the sequestration case to recover ill-gotten wealth instead of behest loans like in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto, the connivance and conspiracy among the public officials involved and the beneficiaries of the favors illegally extended rendered it similarly well-nigh impossible for the State, as the aggrieved party, to have known of the commission of the crimes charged prior to the EDSA Revolution in 1986. Notwithstanding the highly publicized and widely-known nature of the PNPPP, the unlawful acts or transactions in relation to it were discovered only through the PCGG’s exhaustive investigation, resulting in the establishment of a prima facie case sufficient for the PCGG to institute Civil Case No. 0013 against Disini. Before the discovery, the PNPPP contracts, which partook of a public character, enjoyed the presumption of their execution having been regularly done in the course of official functions. Considering further that during the Marcos regime, no person would have dared to assail the legality of the transactions, it would be unreasonable to expect that the discovery of the unlawful transactions was possible prior to 1986.

Criminal Law; Corruption of Public Officials; Elements of.

The elements of corruption of public officials under Article 212 of the Revised Penal Code are:

1. That the offender makes offers or promises, or gives gifts or presents to a public officer; and
2. That the offers or promises are made or the gifts or presents are given to a public officer under circumstances that will make the public officer liable for direct bribery or indirect bribery.

The allegations in the information for corruption of public officials, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the crime. The information stated that: (1) Disini made an offer and promise, and gave gifts to President Marcos, a public officer; and (2) in consideration of the offers, promises and gifts, President Marcos, in causing the award of the contracts to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse by taking advantage of his position and in committing said act in relation to his office, was placed under circumstances that would make him liable for direct bribery. The second element of corruption of public officers simply required the public officer to be placed under circumstances, not absolute certainty, that would make him liable for direct or indirect bribery. Thus, even without alleging that President Marcos received or accepted Disini’s offers, promises and gifts – an essential element in direct bribery – the allegation that President Marcos caused the award of the contracts to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse sufficed to place him under circumstances of being liable for direct bribery.

Criminal; Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019); Elements of the offense under Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019.

The sufficiency of the allegations in the information charging the violation of Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019 is similarly upheld. The elements of the offense under Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019 are:

1. That the offender has family or close personal relation with a public official;
2. That he capitalizes or exploits or takes advantage of such family or close personal relation by directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any present, gift, material or pecuniary advantage from any person having some business, transaction, application, request, or contract with the government;
3. That the public official with whom the offender has family or close personal relation has to intervene in the business transaction, application, request, or contract with the government.

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Miranda, et al. vs. Tuliao

Miranda, et al. vs. Tuliao

   October 23, 2017       FJ

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JOSE MIRANDA, et al. vs. VIRGILIO TULIAO

G.R. NO. 158763 MARCH 31, 2006

486 SCRA 377

PLEASE NOTE THAT YOU ARE PRESUMED THAT YOU HAVE READ THE ORIGINAL TEXT OF THE CASE. THIS IS FOR THE PURPOSE OF REVIEW. *Read at your own risk* :)

(Criminal Procedure)

FACTS:

·         March 8, 1996 – burnt dead bodies of  Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao were found in Ramon, Isabela.

·         Two  informations for muder were filed against, SPO1 Leaño, SPO1 Marzan, SPO1 Agustin, SPO2 Micu, SPO2 Maderal, and SPO4 Ramirez in the RTC Santiago City

·         The venue was later transferred in Manila

·         April 22, 1999 – RTC Manila ➜  All = CONVICTED EXCEPT SPO2 Madera while has yet to be arraigned.

·         Sept. 1999 - Maderal was arrested

·         April 27, 2001 – Maderal ➜  Sworn confession and identified Miranda, PO3 Ocon, SPO3 Dalmacio, Boyet dela Cruz and Amado Doe – responsible for the death of the victims

·         Tuliao ---- filed a complaint for murder

·         June 29 - Miranda➜  Urgent motion to complete PI, to reinvestigate, and to recall and/or quash the woa.

·         July 6 – In the hearing of the urgent motion, Judge Tumaliuan noted the absence of the petitioners ➜ Joint Order – DENIED because the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons

·         Miranda ➜  appealed the reso of the State Prosec to the DOJ.

·         August 17 – PJ Anghad took over ➜  Joint Order – reversing the JO of the former Judge and ordered the cancellation of the WOA ➜  also applied to Ocon and Dalmacio.

·         Tulia and SP ➜ MR and prayed inhibition of PJ Anghad ➜ DENIED

·         Case against the first set of accused who were convicted = APPEALED➜ SC ➜  Oct. 9, 2001 – ACQUITTED

·         Oct. 25, 2001 – Tuliao➜  Cert. Prohib. Mandam. With TRO➜  SC

·         Nov. 12, 2001 – SC➜ Reso – GRANT the Petition

·         Nov. 14, 2001 – PJ Anghad➜  DISMISSED the two informations

·         Nov. 15, 2001 - SC ➜ TRO while referring the petition to CA

·         Dec. 18, 2002 - CA ➜ GRANTED and ORDER the reinstatement of the crim cases in the RTC Santiago and issuance of woa

·         Miranda ➜ MR ➜  DENIED

HELD: in favor Tuliao

·         The case is reinstated and transferred to the RTC Manila

·         PJ Anghad exercised grave abuse of discretion

·         CUSTODY OF LAW v. JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON

(YES) there can be COL = no JOP
(YES) there can be JOP = not in COL

(In Pico Case) 
 GR: One who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court.

ETR: SPECIAL APPEARANCES

In the case of pleadings whose prayer is precisely for the avoidance of the jurisdiction of the court. These pleadings are:

1. CIVIL CASES	MT Dismiss – LOJ over the person of the defendant (whether or not other grounds for dismissal are included)	Consequences of the fact that FAILURE to file = WAIVER of the defense “Lack of Jurisdiction Over the Person”
2. CRIMINAL CASES	MT Quash a complaint – LOJ over the person of the accused
3.	MT Quash a WOA	That it is the very legality of the court process forcing the submission of the person of the accused that is the very issue in a MTQ of the woa

(In Santiago Case)
Seeking affirmative relief whether civil or criminal = voluntary appearance

CUSTODY OF LAW	JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON
Required for the application for bail	NOT
NOT required for the adjudication of other relief sought.	Mere application = waiver of the defense lack of JOP
Accomplished by ARREST or VOLUNTARY SURRENDER	Acquired upon ARREST or VOLUNTARY APPEARANCE
Literally custody over the body of the accused

OTHER NOTES:

Criminal Procedure; Warrants of Arrest; Even if the petition for review of the resolution of the assistant prosecutor was filed with the Secretary of Justice before the issuance of the warrants of arrest, the fact remains that the pendency of a petition for the review of the prosecutor's resolution is not a ground to quash the warrants of arrest.

After Judge Tumaliuan issued warrants for the arrest of petitioners, petitioner Miranda appealed the assistant prosecutor's resolution before the Secretary of Justice. Judge Anghad, shortly after assuming office, quashed the warrant of arrest on the basis of said appeal. According to Judge Anghad, "x x x prudence dictates (that) and because of comity, a deferment of the proceedings is but proper."

Quashal on this basis is grave abuse of discretion. It is inconceivable to charge Judge Tumaliuan as lacking in prudence and oblivious to comity when he issued the warrants of arrest against petitioners just because the petitioners might, in the future, appeal the assistant prosecutor's resolution to the Secretary of Justice. But even if the petition for review was filed before the issuance of the warrants of arrest, the fact remains that the pendency of a petition for the review of the prosecutor's resolution is not a ground to quash the warrants of arrest.

Criminal Procedure; Probable Cause; Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt.

It is important to note that an exhaustive debate on the credibility of a witness is not within the province of the determination of probable cause. As we held in Webb:

A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. As well put in Brinegar v. United States, while probable cause demands more than "bare suspicion," it requires "less than evidence which would justify x x x conviction." A finding of probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. It is not a pronouncement of guilt.

x x x Probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and should be determined in a summary manner. Preliminary investigation is not a part of trial x x x.

Criminal Procedure; Judgments; A decision acquitting the accused of a crime cannot be the basis of the dismissal of criminal case against different accused for the same crime.

A decision, even of this Court, acquitting the accused therein of a crime cannot be the basis of the dismissal of criminal case against different accused for the same crime.  The blunder of Judge Anghad is even more pronounced by the fact that our decision in Leaño was based on reasonable doubt.  We never ruled in Leaño that the crime did not happen; we just found that there was reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused therein, since the prosecution in that case relied on circumstantial evidence, which interestingly is not even the situation in the criminal cases of the petitioners in the case at bar as there is here an eyewitness: Rodel Maderal.  The accused in Leaño furthermore had no motive to kill respondent Tuliao's son, whereas petitioners herein had been implicated in the testimony of respondent Tuliao before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee.

Criminal Procedure; The declaration of nullity of proceedings should be deemed to carry with it the reinstatement of the orders set aside by the nullified proceedings.

Whether the Court of Appeals ordered the issuance of new warrants of arrest or merely ordered the reinstatement of the warrants of arrest issued by Judge Tumaliuan is merely a matter of scrupulous semantics, the slight inaccuracy whereof should not be allowed to affect the dispositions on the merits, especially in this case where the other dispositions of the Court of Appeals point to the other direction.  Firstly, the Court of Appeals had reinstated the 25 June 2001 Order of Judge Tumaliuan, which issued the warrants of arrest.  Secondly, the Court of Appeals likewise declared the proceedings conducted by Judge Anghad void.  Certainly, the declaration of nullity of proceedings should be deemed to carry with it the reinstatement of the orders set aside by the nullified proceedings. Judge Anghad's order quashing the warrants of arrest had been nullified; therefore those warrants of arrest are henceforth deemed unquashed.

Criminal Procedure; Constitutional Law; Double Jeopardy cannot be invoked where the accused has not been arraigned and it was upon his express motion that the case was dismissed.

The reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed before arraignment does not constitute double jeopardy.  Double jeopardy cannot be invoked where the accused has not been arraigned and it was upon his express motion that the case was dismissed. 

Criminal Law; Bails; Custody of the law is required before the court can act upon the application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other reliefs sought by the defendant where the mere application therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused.

Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction between custody of the law and jurisdiction over the person. Custody of the law is required before the court can act upon the application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other reliefs sought by the defendant where the mere application therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused. Custody of the law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary surrender, while jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance. One can be under the custody of the law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, such as when a person arrested by virtue of a warrant files a motion before arraignment to quash the warrant. On the other hand, one can be subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet not be in the custody of the law, such as when an accused escapes custody after his trial has commenced. Being in the custody of the law signifies restraint on the person, who is thereby deprived of his own will and liberty, binding him to become obedient to the will of the law. Custody of the law is literally custody over the body of the accused. It includes, but is not limited to, detention.

Criminal Law; A person applying for admission to bail must be in the custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty. A person who has not submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court has no right to invoke the processes of that court.

The statement in Pico v. Judge Combong, Jr., cited by the Court of Appeals should not have been separated from the issue in that case, which is the application for admission to bail of someone not yet in the custody of the law.  The entire paragraph of our pronouncement in Pico reads: 

A person applying for admission to bail must be in the custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty.  A person who has not submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court has no right to invoke the processes of that court.  Respondent Judge should have diligently ascertained the whereabouts of the applicant and that he indeed had jurisdiction over the body of the accused before considering the application for bail.

While we stand by our above pronouncement in Pico insofar as it concerns bail, we clarify that, as a general rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. As we held in the aforecited case of Santiago, seeking an affirmative relief in court, whether in civil or criminal proceedings, constitutes voluntary appearance.

Criminal Law; Courts; Jurisdictions; Filing of pleadings seeking affirmative relief constitutes voluntary appearance and consequent submission of one's person to the jurisdiction of the court, Exceptions.

There is, however, an exception to the rule that filing pleadings seeking affirmative relief constitutes voluntary appearance, and the consequent submission of one's person to the jurisdiction of the court. This is in the case of pleadings whose prayer is precisely for the avoidance of the jurisdiction of the court, which only leads to a special appearance. 

These pleadings are:

(1) in civil cases, motions to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, whether or not other grounds for dismissal are included;

(2) in criminal cases, motions to quash a complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused; and

(3) motions to quash a warrant of arrest. The first two are consequences of the fact that failure to file them would constitute a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person. The third is a consequence of the fact that it is the very legality of the court process forcing the submission of the person of the accused that is the very issue in a motion to quash a warrant of arrest.

Judicial Ethics; Judges; Abuse of Discretion; Records and supporting evidence show that Judge Anghad gravely abused his discretion. 

After a careful scrutiny of the records of the case, including the supporting evidence to the resolution of the prosecutor in his determination of probable cause, we find that Judge Anghad gravely abused his discretion.

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Tijam, et al. vs. Sibonghanoy, et al.

Tijam, et al. vs. Sibonghanoy, et al.

   October 23, 2017       FJ

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SERAFIN TIJAM, et al. vs. MAGDALENO SIBONGHANOY, et al.

G.R. NO. L-21450 APRIL 15, 1968

131 PHIL REP 556

PLEASE NOTE THAT YOU ARE PRESUMED THAT YOU HAVE READ THE ORIGINAL TEXT OF THE CASE. THIS IS FOR THE PURPOSE OF REVIEW. *Read at your own risk* :)

(Criminal Procedure)

FACTS:

·         July 19, 1948 - The Sps. Tijam filed a complaint for collection of sum of money with writ of attachment against Sps. Sibonghanoy.

·         July 31 - Counter-bound filed by the defendants and Manila Surety and Fidelity Co. Inc. (Surety).

·         RTC – in favor of Tijam; issued the writ of execution (woe) against defendants however insufficient; further issued against the Surety.

·         Surety ---> written opposition; failure to prosecute and absence of demand upon surety for the payment.

·         Plaintiff ---> 2^nd motion to issue WOE.

·         Surety ---> MTQ the writ; without required summary hearing ---> RTC DENIED.

·         Surety ---> APPEAL to CA; although not one of the Assignment of Errors it is obvious raises the QUESTION OF LACK OF JURISDICTION.

·         January 10, 1963, Surety ---> MTD before RTC; Tijam’s action for recovery of P 1,908 should be filed before the inferior courts; according to SEC. 88 (RA 296 – Judiciaty Act of 1948) : “within the original exclusive jurisdiction of the inferior courts, all civil actions where the value of the subject matter or the amount of the demand does NOT exceed P 2,000” the law was effective on  JUNE 17, 1948.

THEREFORE, RTC has NO JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER

HELD: in favor of the Sps. Tijam

·         The rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred upon the courts exclusively by law, and as a lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of the case, the objection may be raised at any stage of the proceedings.

·         HOWEVER, in the present case, SURETY IS NOW BARRED BY LACHES from invoking this plea at this late hour for the purport of annulling everything done

·         15 YEARS before the surety filed MTD on raising the question of lack of jurisdiction for the first time.

·         LACHES – is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier.

·         DOCTRINE OF LACHES / STALE DEMANDS – upon the grounds of public policy, which requires,  for the peace of the society  and discouragement of stale claims.

- it is NOT a mere question of time but principally a question of inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.

NOTES:

Remedial Law; Party guilty of laches may not invoke lack o jurisdiction on appeal as in instant case - 

It is undisputed fact that the action commenced by the appellees in the CFI of Cebu against the Sibonghanoy spouses was for the recovery of the sum of P 1,908.00 only - an amount within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts in accordance with the pro­visions of the Judiciary Act of 1948 which had taken effect about a month prior to the date when the action was commenced. True also is the rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred upon the courts exclusively by law, and as the lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of the case, the objection may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. However, considering the facts and circumstances of the present case - which shall forth­with be set forth - We are of the opinion that the Surety is now barred by laches from invoking this plea at this late hour for the purpose of annuling everything done heretofore in the case with its active participation.

Remedial Law; Estoppel; Different ways a party may be barred from raising question - 

A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different reason. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, of estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches.

Remedial Law; Laches; Definition

Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.

Remedial Law; Instances when party may be estopped from invoking question of jusridiction.

A party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. In the case just cited, by way of explaining the rule, it was further said that the question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the subject matter of the action or of the parties was not important in such cases because the party is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for, the reason that such a practice can not be tolerated - obviously for reasons of public policy.

Remedial Law; Failure to raise question of Jurisdiction at an earlier stage bars party from questioning it later.

Where from the time the Surety became a quasi-party on July 31, 1948, it could have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Cebu to take cognizance of the present action by reason of the sum of money involved which, according to the law then in force, was within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at several stages of the proceedings in the court a quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final adjudication on the merits. It was only after an adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction. Were We to sanction such conduct on its part, We would in effect be declaring as useless all the proceedings had in the present case since it was commenced on July 19, 1948 and compel the judgment creditors to go up their Calvary once more. The inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent but revolting.

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